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OPINION 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 The instant case calls upon us to decide whether a state 
statute restricting access to a polling place infringes on the 
media‟s First Amendment right to gather news.  Appellant PG 
Publishing Company (“Appellant” or “PG”) seeks review of 
the District Court‟s decision to dismiss its suit against 
election officials for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  
Specifically, Appellant alleges violations of the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Appellant also seeks review of the 
District Court‟s refusal to enter a consent decree agreed to by 
4 
PG and one of the parties relating to the suit.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will affirm the District Court‟s decisions.  
I.     Background 
 Appellant brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against (1) Appellee Carol Aichele (“Appellee”) in her 
capacity as the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, (2) the Allegheny County Board of Elections, 
and (3) Mark Wolosik in his capacity as the Division 
Manager for the County Elections Division (collectively, 
“Defendants”).1  Appellant‟s suit addressed the 
constitutionality of 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 3060(d), a portion of 
the Pennsylvania Election Code mandating that 
[a]ll persons, except election officers, clerks, 
machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, 
persons in the course of voting, persons 
lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace 
and police officers, when permitted by the 
provisions of this act, must remain at least ten 
(10) feet distant from the polling place during 
the progress of the voting. 
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 3060(d).  A “polling place” is “the room 
provided in each election district for voting at a primary or 
election.”  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2602(q). 
                                                          
 
1
 The Board and Mr. Wolosik are not participating in 
this appeal. 
5 
 In its Amended Complaint, Appellant asserted two 
claims:
2
 (1) that § 3060(d) infringed on its First Amendment 
“right to access and gather news at polling places” (“Count 
I”), and (2) that Defendants‟ selective enforcement of § 
3060(d) presented a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count II”).  (App. at 81a-
84a.) 
 In support of Count I, Appellant alleged that “its 
reporters and photographers had previously been denied 
access to polling places to gather news” in Allegheny and 
Beaver Counties.  (Id. at 76a.)  Appellant also alleged that, in 
October 2008, Mr. Wolosik and the Allegheny County Board 
of Elections notified Appellant that not only was “any type of 
recording inside the polling place . . . prohibited under [the 
County‟s] policy,” but that “the Pennsylvania Election Code 
limited [Appellant‟s] reporters and photographers from being 
inside polling places” altogether.3  (Id. at 76a.)  Appellant 
                                                          
 
2
 The Amended Complaint purported to allege three 
causes of action; however, the third count appears to be a 
request for injunctive relief based on Appellant‟s claim of an 
Equal Protection Clause violation. 
 
3
 At oral argument, Appellant claimed that § 3060(d), 
as applied in Allegheny County, prohibited its reporters from 
even recording in the direction of a polling place.  This is not 
so.  In November 2008, in a separate state proceeding, 
Appellant successfully petitioned the state court for an order, 
directing that 
[Mr. Wolosik and the Allegheny County Board 
of Elections] and their agents are hereby 
prohibited from restricting or interfering with 
6 
further contended that reporting from within polling places 
during the November 6, 2012 election was particularly 
important because “for the first time, the Voter ID Law, 
House Bill No. 934, Session of 2011
4
 [was to be] enforced, 
which [would have required] all electors to present a 
government-approved photo ID in order to be allowed to vote 
in any election in the Commonwealth.”5  (Id. at 79a-80a.)  
                                                                                                                                  
attempts of Plaintiff‟s agents and employees to 
photograph activities in or around polling places 
so long as Plaintiff‟s agents and employees are 
located in areas accessible to the public or into 
which they have otherwise been lawfully 
admitted.  No photography shall be taken from 
inside the polling place or within ten (10) feet 
of the entrance of the polling place. 
(App. at 76a.)  At issue in the state court was Allegheny 
County‟s policy of prohibiting filming from within areas 
accessible to the public and beyond the 10-foot boundary 
imposed by § 3060(d).  Despite the language in the order, the 
state court did not have occasion to rule on the 
constitutionality of § 3060(d) itself.   
 
4
 Nothing in our decision today relates to the Voter ID 
Law.  We mention it only because Appellant has alluded to its 
purported relevance in the Amended Complaint and briefs. 
 
5
 After Appellant filed its Amended Complaint, the 
Pennsylvania courts suspended the operative provision in the 
law.  See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 
2012 WL 4497211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012).  At oral 
argument, both counsel for Appellant and Appellee conceded 
that this past election represented a “soft test” of the law, in 
7 
Appellant sought (1) a declaratory judgment holding § 
3060(d) to be unconstitutional as applied and (2) 
compensatory damages for past infringement of its First 
Amendment rights.
6
 
 To establish its equal protection claim in Count II, 
Appellant alleged that its reporters had been “denied access to 
photograph in polling places in Allegheny and Beaver 
Counties.”  (Id. at 77a.)  At the same time, Appellant set out a 
number of examples where reporters from other Pennsylvania 
newspapers had the opportunity to take photographs inside 
polling places in counties other than Allegheny or Beaver 
Counties.  Finally, Appellant alleged that its own reporters 
previously had been allowed inside polling places in 
Allegheny County “for the purpose of reporting upon and 
photographing the electoral process only as it relates [to 
certain] public figures.”  (Id. at 79a.)  Appellant then 
requested (1) a declaratory judgment that the counties‟ 
application of § 3060(d) violates the Equal Protection Clause 
and (2) injunctive relief (either preliminary or permanent) 
against further discrimination. 
                                                                                                                                  
that identification may have been requested, but was not 
required. 
 
6
 In setting out Count I, Appellant alleged that § 3060 
“impermissibly restrict[ed its] First Amendment right to 
gather news and, thus, [was] facially unconstitutional.”  (App. 
at 82a.)  Read in the context of Appellant‟s other allegations, 
we do not take this language as asserting a facial challenge to 
§ 3060.  Appellant conceded as much during oral argument. 
8 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
Defendants moved to dismiss the suit and the District Court 
granted the motion.  As to Count I, the District Court noted 
that § 3060(d) applies to an individual‟s physical location and 
not his speech, therefore obviating the need to determine 
whether a polling place was a public forum.  PG Publ’g Co. 
v. Aichele, No. 12-CV-960, 2012 WL 4796017, at *22 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 9, 2012).  The District Court then analyzed the 
statute under the rubric of content-neutral laws applied in 
nonpublic fora and held that PG‟s First Amendment rights 
were not abridged given that § 3060(d) is a “[content]-neutral 
law of general application seeking to protect an individual‟s 
„right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of 
intimidation and fraud.‟”  Id. at *27 (quoting Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)). 
 As to the equal protection claim in Count II, the 
District Court held that the examples of inconsistent 
enforcement of § 3060(d) alleged in Appellant‟s Amended 
Complaint did not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation.  Specifically, the District Court held that Appellant 
failed to establish that “a single election official ha[d] 
discriminated against reporters working for” Appellant in 
applying § 3060(d).  Id. at *29 (emphasis in original). 
 Additionally, in September 2012 — roughly a month 
after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss — Appellant 
and the Allegheny County Board of Elections moved jointly 
for entry of a consent decree which they argued, in essence, 
resolved the dispute (“Consent Order”).  The Consent Order 
permitted Appellant and its reporters to enter polling places in 
Allegheny County for purposes of recording the sign-in 
process.  This permission was subject to various restrictions 
including, for example, an obligation for Appellant‟s 
9 
personnel to stop recording if voters objected.  The Consent 
Order was also explicitly “conditioned upon [Appellant] 
discontinuing its action against the Commonwealth.”  (App. 
at 142a.)  Appellee, not a party to the Consent Order, objected 
that the Order was illegal in that it essentially permitted 
Appellant to act in contravention of a valid state law (§ 
3060(d)).  The District Court agreed and refused to enter the 
Order, noting that the parties could not “use a consent decree 
to enforce „terms which would exceed their authority and 
supplant state law.‟”  Id. at *32 (quoting Keith v. Volpe, 118 
F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 PG filed a timely appeal from the District Court‟s 
aforementioned rulings.  Given that Election Day was fast 
approaching, we granted the parties‟ motion to expedite the 
proceedings.  On November 1, 2012, we entered an order 
affirming the District Court‟s rulings.  This opinion sets forth 
the bases of the Order. 
II.     Standard of Review 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s 
grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 
121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss, 
all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as 
true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the 
[Appellant], and all inferences must be drawn in [its favor].”  
McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted).  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 
 We review the District Court‟s ruling regarding the 
Consent Order for an abuse of discretion, see NutraSweet Co. 
v. Vit-Mar Enters., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999), and 
look to see whether the decision was “arbitrary, fanciful or 
clearly unreasonable.”  Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. 
Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 
532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Hanover Potato Prods., 
Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (“An abuse 
of discretion arises when the district court‟s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
III.     The Right of Access 
 Appellant argues that it has a constitutionally protected 
right of access to gather news at the polling place and that any 
restriction on this right must be reviewed under strict 
scrutiny.  While PG never explicitly claims that the media 
should have greater First Amendment rights than the general 
public, Appellant‟s arguments hinge on one particular 
principle: that the Framers “thoughtfully and deliberately 
selected [the press] to improve our society and keep it free.”  
(Appellant‟s Br. 15 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
219 (1966)).
7
 
                                                          
 
7
 The brief filed by the Pennsylvania Newspapers 
Association as amicus curiae advances a similar point.  In 
describing its interest as an amicus, the Association notes that 
it “wishes to participate in this matter [in part] to stress the 
policy considerations that mandate an interpretation of the 
Pennsylvania Election Code and the First Amendment to 
11 
 Appellee counters that (1) Appellant enjoys no greater 
right to gather news than what has been granted to the general 
public, (2) that § 3060(d) is a law of general applicability 
which incidentally burdens Appellant‟s right to gather news, 
and (3) that a polling place is a nonpublic forum thereby 
implicating only a modest constitutional review — one that § 
3060(d) passes. 
 In reviewing the constitutional validity of a statute, 
“[t]he first issue to be addressed . . . is whether a First 
Amendment right exists, for „if it [does] not, we need go no 
further.‟”  Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of 
Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1992) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)).  We 
therefore consider whether a First Amendment right to gather 
news exists, and if it does, whether Appellant enjoys its 
protections. 
A.     The Right of Access is Limited 
 It is beyond peradventure that “[t]he constitutional 
guarantee of a free press „assures the maintenance of our 
political system and an open society,‟ and secures „the 
paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the 
people concerning public officials.‟”  Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (citation omitted); see also Pennekamp 
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-55 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“Without a free press there can be no free 
                                                                                                                                  
safeguard the right of the news media to observe and report 
on the election process in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.”  (Amicus Br. 1.) 
12 
society.  Freedom of the press, however, is not an end in itself 
but a means to the end of a free society.” (footnote omitted)).  
For this reason, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
First Amendment — in addition to protecting freedom of 
speech and the press — must also contain protections for 
some news-gathering activity.  See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“[W]ithout some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated.”). 
 Yet, the Supreme Court has held, time and again, that 
this First Amendment right of access to information is 
qualified and subject to limitations.  In Zemel v. Rusk, the 
Supreme Court held that “[t]he right to speak and publish 
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather 
information.”  381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).  Going further, the 
Court cautioned that: 
[t]here are few restrictions on action which 
could not be clothed by ingenious argument in 
the garb of decreased data flow.  For example, 
the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the 
White House diminishes the citizen‟s 
opportunities to gather information he might 
find relevant to his opinion of the way the 
country is being run, but that does not make 
entry into the White House a First Amendment 
right. 
Id. at 16-17; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684 (“It has 
generally been held that the First Amendment does not 
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally.”); Pell, 417 
U.S. at 834 (“The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar 
13 
government from interfering in any way with a free press.  
The Constitution does not, however, require government to 
accord the press special access to information not shared by 
members of the public generally.”).   
 Appellants are therefore correct in arguing that the 
First Amendment encompasses a right of access for news-
gathering purposes.  However, we decline to hold — as 
Appellant and the amicus curiae hope — that the press is 
entitled to any greater protection under this right than is the 
general public.  The Supreme Court‟s pronouncement on this 
issue is unequivocal:  “[T]he First Amendment does not 
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally.”  
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684.  Thus, while the First 
Amendment does protect Appellant‟s right of access to gather 
news, that right does not extend to all information. 
B.     The Right of Access is Distinct from  
the Right to Free Speech 
 Before proceeding further, we note that the word 
“access” may cause some consternation.8  Much of First 
                                                          
 
8
 The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), recognized this potential 
issue and noted that the name of the right was immaterial — 
the distinction lay in what the right protected: 
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to 
attend criminal trials to hear, see, and 
communicate observations concerning them as 
a „right of access‟ or a „right to gather 
information,‟ for we have recognized that 
14 
Amendment jurisprudence is couched in the language of 
access.  For example, when addressing traditional issues of 
free speech on government property, courts apply the well-
established forum analysis (where the essential formulation is 
whether the government may restrict “access” to a particular 
forum).  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1982) (discussing the 
constitutional difference between restriction on access to 
public and nonpublic fora in the language of a “right of access 
to public property”).   
 Importantly, we do not address here limitations on 
access to a forum for speech purposes; indeed, we are not 
concerned here with expressive conduct or speech at all.  
(Appellant conceded as much at the beginning of oral 
argument.)  Rather, our focus is on access to information.
9
  
                                                                                                                                  
„without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated.‟ 
Id. at 576 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting, 
among others, Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681).   
 
9
 Likewise, we do not address here the right to listen 
— a concept analogous to, but still distinct from the right at 
issue in this case.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976); see also 
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“It would be a barren marketplace 
of ideas that had only sellers and not buyers.”).  The right to 
listen is derivative of an individual‟s right to speak, for the 
Supreme Court has held that “where a [willing] speaker 
exists . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to 
15 
Thus, we do not believe that the traditional forum analysis is 
apposite here.  If we were to apply such a framework, the 
government would be free to shut down nonpublic fora 
completely, thereby hiding any activities behind a veil of 
secrecy.
10
  It cannot be that the First Amendment would 
                                                                                                                                  
its source and to its recipients both.”  Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 
425 U.S. at 756 (footnote omitted).  Our own jurisprudence 
likewise maintains that “where one enjoys a right to speak, 
others hold a „reciprocal right to receive‟ that speech, which 
„may be asserted‟ in court.”  Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 
489 F.3d 156, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In determining 
standing, the right to listen depends entirely on the 
infringement on the rights of a willing speaker.”).  
Interestingly, while courts have sometimes cast the right to 
listen in the mold of “the media‟s right to gather news,” see, 
e.g., Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 
1988), that is merely a matter of semantics — those cases still 
dealt with questions of speech and the forum analysis. 
 
10
 We take this opportunity to make explicit that which 
has been implicit in our preceding discussion:  A polling 
place is a nonpublic forum.  See Burson, 504 U.S. at 201-06 
(plurality) (discussing the history of voting and the long-
evolving pattern of laws limiting expression in and access to 
the polling place); id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is 
doctrinally less confusing to acknowledge that the environs of 
a polling place, on election day, are simply not a „traditional 
public forum‟ — which means that they are subject to speech 
restrictions that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”); 
Marlin v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 236 F.3d 716 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (“The forum here, the interior of a polling place, is 
neither a traditional public forum nor a government-
designated one.  It is not available for general public 
16 
countenance such a course of action.  See Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) (“A free press cannot be 
made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to 
supply it with information.”).11 
                                                                                                                                  
discourse of any sort.” (citing Burson, 504 U.S. at 201-06)); 
see also United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. 
City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738, 749-50 (6th Cir. 2004); Cotz v. 
Mastroeni, 476 F. Supp. 2d 332, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“Polling places clearly are non-public fora and voters present 
are subject to various First Amendment restrictions, including 
those based on content.”).  Despite Appellant‟s conclusory 
statement in its Amended Complaint that “[a] polling place is 
a traditional public forum under the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution,” (App. at 80a), the weight of 
precedent holds that it is not.  Moreover, Appellant can point 
to no conduct on the part of the Commonwealth — neither in 
its policy nor its practice — that would suggest an intent to 
designate the polling place otherwise.  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 
802 (O‟Connor, J.) (noting that “[t]he government does not 
create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited 
discourse”). 
 
11
 As our discussion above should make clear: the right 
of access is distinct from the right to free speech.  Thus, 
where the First Amendment does not protect a right of access 
to a particular proceeding, this fact has no bearing on any 
constitutional protections for expressive speech at the same 
proceeding.  For instance, even if we find no constitutional 
protection for a right of access to the polling place, this would 
not absolve courts from undertaking a traditional forum 
analysis in determining whether an individual has the right to 
speak inside of the polling place. 
17 
 For this reason, we consider Appellant‟s citation to 
cases such as Munro, which focused on exit-polling, to be of 
little help.  Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 382 
(9th Cir. 1988).  The act of exit-polling has been held by our 
sister circuits to constitute protected expressive speech.  See, 
e.g., id. at 384 (“The media plaintiffs‟ exit polling constitutes 
speech protected by the First Amendment, not only in that the 
information disseminated based on the polls is speech, but 
also in that the process of obtaining the information requires a 
discussion between pollster and voter.”).  The analysis that 
these courts apply to laws curtailing exit-polling activities — 
i.e., the traditional forum analysis — is therefore distinct from 
what is necessary here. 
 Appellant also urges that the instant case should be 
evaluated under the rubric of a prior restraint.  We disagree.  
While it is true that restricting access to information may 
work a prior restraint on speech, see In re Express-News 
Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978), this principle 
is not unlimited.  For 
[i]t is one thing to say that a journalist is free to 
seek out sources of information not available to 
members of the general public, that he is 
entitled to some constitutional protection of the 
confidentiality of such sources, and that the 
government cannot restrain the publication of 
news emanating from such sources.  It is quite 
another thing to suggest that the Constitution 
imposes upon government the affirmative duty 
to make available to journalists sources of 
information not available to members of the 
public generally.  This proposition finds no 
18 
support in the words of the Constitution or in 
any decision of this Court. 
Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35 (1974) (citing, among others, N.Y. 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).  Thus, the 
case at hand does not implicate the “kind of classic prior 
restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”  
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34 (1984); 
see also United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 861 (3d 
Cir. 1978) (holding that there was “[n]o prior restraint . . . 
involved” where the court imposed restrictions on 
information adduced at a pre-trial suppression hearing).
12
 
 For this reason, we distinguish those cases cited by 
Appellant that concern court orders prohibiting members of 
the press (and others) from contacting jurors.  See, e.g., In re 
                                                          
 
12
 We do not come to this conclusion lightly.  Systems 
of prior restraint are rightly considered to be antithetical to 
the Constitution and thereby come before the courts “bearing 
a heavy presumption against [their] constitutional validity.”  
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714; see also 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“It is difficult to 
conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgement of the 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press [than a 
restraint on the publication of editorials].”).  But “[t]he phrase 
„prior restraint‟ is not a self-wielding sword.  Nor can it serve 
as a talismanic test.”  Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 
436, 441 (1957).  We find that the instant case — where the 
law concerns only access (not even subsequent use) to already 
nonpublic information — does not necessarily implicate the 
exacting constitutional scrutiny reserved for evaluating prior 
restraints. 
19 
Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807; Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358.  
Here, the government is not restricting access to information 
per se; rather it is restricting access to a particular proceeding 
(i.e., the voting process that occurs inside polling places).  
Unlike the juror-interview cases, therefore, Appellant is free 
to contact voters and individuals working in a polling place in 
order to obtain information about the goings-on inside.  There 
is no blanket gag order curtailing access to this information.
13
 
 Instead, we find that the analysis in this case turns on 
the question of whether the source of information (here, 
access to the polling place) should be “available to members 
of the public generally.”  Thus, we must determine the proper 
                                                          
 
13
 We have also defined the right of access as being 
distinct from the right of publication (which, as explained 
below, is a particular kind of prior restraint): 
The obvious must also be stated.  The 
Coalition‟s claims are based on an alleged right 
of access, not a right of publication.  Although 
both have their roots in the First Amendment, 
these principles are doctrinally discrete, and 
precedents in one area may not be 
indiscriminately applied to the other.  In 
general, the right of publication is the broader 
of the two, and in most instances, publication 
may not be constitutionally prohibited even 
though access to the particular information may 
properly be denied. 
First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 
784 F.2d 467, 471-72 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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analytical framework for evaluating this question.  As the 
discussion below demonstrates, the matter here concerns 
information about government bodies, their processes, and 
their decisions.  As such, our analysis of the public‟s right to 
access the source of this information turns on both historical 
and structural considerations.  We must balance the interests 
of the government on the one hand and those of the press and 
public on the other. 
C.     The Right of Access in the Supreme Court: The 
Experience and Logic Test 
 The Supreme Court has suggested that the existence of 
a First Amendment right to gather news (i.e., the right of 
access to the source of information or a government process) 
is best evaluated via a balancing test.  The necessity of such a 
test was first noted in Branzburg v. Hayes, where a reporter 
had claimed that testifying before a grand jury about 
confidential sources would violate his right to gather news.  
408 U.S. 665.  A plurality of the Court acknowledged that, 
“without some [First Amendment] protection for seeking out 
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”  Id. at 
681.  On the other hand, the plurality did not believe that this 
protection for news-gathering extended endlessly.  Id. at 681-
83 (“[The press] has no special immunity from the application 
of general laws [and] no special privilege to invade the rights 
and liberties of others.”).  Thus, they affirmed the principle 
that the press is not guaranteed a “constitutional right of 
special access to information not available to the public 
generally.”  Id. at 684 (citing, inter alia, Zemel, 381 U.S. at 
16-17, and N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 728-
30 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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 Having set the operative framework, the plurality then 
engaged in a balancing inquiry to determine which set of 
rights should prevail.  In his concurrence, Justice Powell 
summarized the sentiment of the plurality and his own 
position:  “The asserted claim to privilege should be judged 
on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between 
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give 
relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”  Id. at 
710.  He added that “[t]he balance of these vital constitutional 
and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the 
tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.”  Id. 
 Subsequently, the Court embarked on a similar 
balancing inquiry to uphold a California Department of 
Corrections regulation that prohibited the press and others 
from interviewing specific inmates.  See Pell, 417 U.S. at 
831-32.  Prior to the enactment of the regulation in question, 
journalists “had virtually free access to interview any 
individual inmate” while non-press members of the public did 
not benefit from such an unrestricted visitation policy.  Id. at 
831.  Journalists claimed that the new regulation, by limiting 
their news gathering activities, violated the First Amendment 
protections for freedom of the press.  Id. at 820-21.  Holding 
that the press does not enjoy any greater constitutional 
protection than does the general public, the Court ultimately 
agreed with the prison administrators that the interest in 
preserving security in the prisons outweighed the press‟s right 
to gather news, partly based on the fact that the press had an 
alternative means of obtaining this information.  Id. at 829-
34. 
 But while the opinions in Branzburg and Pell 
presented an ad hoc approach, the case of Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia suggested a more standardized 
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framework for evaluating the right of access to information 
about government processes.  448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality).  
In that case, reporters sought access to a courtroom that had 
been closed to the public to prevent undue dissemination of 
witness-related information, arguing that there were less 
restrictive means for ensuring a fair trial.  The plurality 
reaffirmed the First Amendment‟s protection of the press and 
recognized that the First Amendment necessarily also 
“„prohibit[ed] government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.‟”  
Id. at 575-76 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).  Finding that access to trials could 
not be “foreclosed arbitrarily,” the Richmond Newspapers 
opinion suggested the framework for a more meaningful test 
on restrictions in nonpublic fora such as a courtroom.  Id. at 
577. 
 The plurality acknowledged that courtrooms were 
nonpublic fora, but recognized the important role of their 
historical openness to the public — namely, that the public 
provides the oversight necessary to maintain the integrity of 
the judicial process.  Id. at 573 n.9.  As for the prison cases 
(e.g., Pell), the plurality distinguished them on the ground 
that trials were traditionally open to the public whereas 
prisons were not.  Id. at 576 n.11.  In addition to this 
historical tradition of openness, the plurality also noted that 
the presence of the public and its representatives “historically 
has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what 
takes place” in the courtroom.  Id. at 578. 
 Justice Brennan, writing in a concurrence, summarized 
“two helpful principles” drawn from the plurality‟s opinion: 
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First, the case for a right of access has special 
force when drawn from an enduring and vital 
tradition of public entree to particular 
proceedings or information.  Such a tradition 
commands respect in part because the 
Constitution carries the gloss of history.  More 
importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies 
the favorable judgment of experience.  Second, 
the value of access must be measured in 
specifics.  Analysis is not advanced by 
rhetorical statements that all information bears 
upon public issues; what is crucial in individual 
cases is whether access to a particular 
government process is important in terms of 
that very process. 
Id. at 589 (citation omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring).  This 
distillation — effectively juxtaposing the People‟s historical 
practice of and interest in monitoring government with the 
State‟s historical practice of and interest in keeping certain 
information from public view — formed the basis for what 
has become the Court‟s balancing test for evaluating whether 
a right of access to government information exists. 
 Indeed, the Court embraced this framework in a 
subsequent right of access case, Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), 
where the press sought access to a criminal trial involving the 
sexual abuse of underage victims.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Brennan explained why a right of access attached to 
criminal trials: 
First, the criminal trial historically has been 
open to the press and general public. . . . And 
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since that time the presumption of openness has 
remained secure. . . . Second, the right of access 
to criminal trials plays a particularly significant 
role in the functioning of the judicial process 
and the government as a whole. . . . In sum, the 
institutional value of the open criminal trial is 
recognized in both logic and experience. 
Id. at 605-06 (emphasis added).  Finding that both factors 
weighed heavily in favor of openness, the Court in Globe held 
that the press had a qualified right of access because the right 
to access criminal trials is “of constitutional stature.”  Id. at 
606.  Consequently, the Court held that the government could 
restrict access to criminal trials only if the restriction was 
necessitated “by a compelling governmental interest, and 
[was] narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”  Id. at 606-07. 
 Arguably the most complete statement of the Court‟s 
balancing test came in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 
of California for Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1 (1986), in 
which the Supreme Court considered the right of access to 
preliminary hearings in criminal trials.  The Court held that a 
right of First Amendment access requires a two-prong 
evaluation of “whether the place and process have historically 
been open to the press” and “whether public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question.”  Id. at 8.  Where both prongs of the test 
are satisfied, “a qualified First Amendment right of public 
access attaches.”  Id. at 9. 
 These three cases — Richmond Newspapers, Globe, 
and Press-Enterprise — set out a balancing test for evaluating 
whether a right of access to information about government 
bodies, their processes, and their decision exists.  This 
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framework, referred to either as the Richmond Newspapers 
test or the “experience and logic” test, balances the interests 
of the People in observing and monitoring the functions of 
their government against the government‟s interest and/or 
long-standing historical practice of keeping certain 
information from public scrutiny.  If a right of access exists, 
any restraint on that right is then evaluated under strict 
scrutiny.  See Globe, 457 U.S. 606-07. 
 Our Circuit has also applied the Richmond Newspapers 
balancing test in various contexts.  While the Supreme Court 
decisions discussed above largely cabin the test‟s application 
to situations addressing criminal proceedings, our own 
jurisprudence demonstrates a willingness to apply the test 
more broadly.  Still, we have never applied Richmond 
Newspapers to a polling place or to the process of voting.  As 
such, it is a matter of first impression.  Thus, our focus is on 
the appropriate scope and application of the test.  We look to 
our prior decisions for guidance. 
D.     The Experience and Logic Test in the Third Circuit 
 In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 
(3d Cir. 1984), we expanded the application of Richmond 
Newspapers to civil trials.  We reasoned that “[t]he Supreme 
Court‟s recognition of a First Amendment right of access to 
criminal trials is predicated on „the common understanding 
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the 
free discussion of governmental affairs,‟” and that, in civil 
trials, too, the “public right of access . . . is inherent in the 
nature of our democratic form of government.”  Id. at 1068-
69 (emphasis added) (quoting Globe, 457 U.S. at 604). 
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 Two years later, in First Amendment Coalition v. 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 
1986), we considered a right of access claim to records of 
Pennsylvania‟s Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.  
Assuming that a right of access did exist, we considered the 
point at which this right attached under Richmond 
Newspapers.  See id. at 472; see also North Jersey Media 
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(reading First Amendment Coalition as applying the 
“experience and logic” test).  While we ultimately noted that 
Board proceedings did not “have a long history of openness,” 
the case illustrates our willingness to expand the application 
of the Richmond Newspapers framework beyond litigation 
proceedings.  First Amendment Coal., 784 F.2d at 472; see 
also id. at 481 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing that “[t]he correct legal analysis here flows in 
large measure from the historical record” and the standards 
set forth in Globe and Press-Enterprise).
14
 
 Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 
(3d Cir. 1986) (en banc), decided the same year as First 
Amendment Coalition, stands as a watershed case.  That 
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 We have also extended the “experience and logic” 
analysis to other portions of the criminal trial process.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 
1985) (determining, by “employing the historical and 
structural analysis mandated by [Richmond Newspapers, 
Globe and Press-Enterprise], whether there is a First 
Amendment right of access to indictments.  Although those 
cases concerned access to judicial proceedings, no reason 
occurs to us why their analysis does not apply as well to 
judicial documents . . . ”). 
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proceeding concerned a claimed right of access to certain 
administrative records held by the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Resources (“D.E.R.”).  We concluded that 
Richmond Newspapers, Globe and Press-Enterprise “hold no 
more than that the government may not close government 
proceedings which historically have been open” except where 
“public access contributes nothing of significant value to that 
process or [where] there is a compelling state interest in 
closure and a carefully tailored resolution of the conflict 
between that interest and First Amendment concerns.”  Id. at 
1173.  In effect, we held that the three cases do no more than 
set forth the generalized “experience and logic” test for 
evaluating the right of access to traditionally open 
government proceedings.  Id. at 1174-76. 
 Moreover, in evaluating the existence of the right to 
access D.E.R. files, we were cognizant of the fact that the 
Supreme Court had not yet applied the “experience and logic” 
test “to the context of executive branch files.”  Id. at 1174.  
Nevertheless, we assumed, without deciding, that the test 
applied to such information and proceeded with our 
evaluation.  Id. at 1174-75; see also id. at 1177-78 (Adams, J., 
concurring).  Capital Cities therefore stands as the broadest 
suggested application of the “experience and logic” test, 
arguing that it can be applied beyond the limited context of 
criminal and civil trials to cover a greater expanse of 
information related to government bodies, their processes, 
and decisions.
15
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 We recognize the very real concerns our colleagues 
raised in their dissent from Capital Cities: 
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 Our willingness to apply the “experience and logic” 
test beyond judicial proceedings was once again evidenced in 
Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 
F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999).  In that case, we considered whether 
a private enterprise, rather than a newspaper, had a First 
Amendment right to videotape “a meeting of the Township 
Planning Commission.”  Id. at 178.  In dicta, and relying on 
Globe, we reasoned that “[b]ecause a „major purpose of the 
First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs,‟ the public and press have the right to 
attend certain types of governmental proceedings.”  Id. at 180 
(citation omitted) (quoting Globe, 457 U.S. at 604).  
Consequently, we felt “no hesitation in holding Whiteland 
Woods had a constitutional right of access to the Planning 
Commission,” explaining that “[w]hether the public has a 
First Amendment right of access to a particular government 
                                                                                                                                  
The question . . . is whether government may, 
consistent with the speech-press clause, without 
offering any justification whatever for doing so, 
impose the ultimate prior restraint of imposed 
ignorance about its affairs simply by refusing 
access to information in the possession of 
public officials.  The majority holds that it may.  
The governing case law quite plainly is 
otherwise. 
Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1186-87 (Gibbons, J., et al., 
dissenting).  Here, we expressly do not reach the issue of 
whether — even in light of Capital Cities — the “experience 
and logic” test is appropriately applied to cases addressing 
access to legislative or executive records.  That case is for 
another day. 
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proceeding depends on” the outcome of the experience and 
logic test.  Id. at 180-81 (citing Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 
1174); see also North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 214 (noting that the 
right of access discussion in Whiteland is dicta). 
 All of the decisions discussed above informed our 
analysis in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, a case 
in which we focused on the media‟s right of access to 
deportation proceedings.  308 F.3d 199.  In defending its 
restriction, the government argued that “the absence of an 
explicit guarantee of access for Article I and II 
proceedings . . . gives rise to a distinction with a difference 
because, without an incorporating provision parallel to the 
Sixth Amendment, the Framers must have intended to deny 
the public access to political proceedings.”  North Jersey, 308 
F.3d at 207.  “Our own jurisprudence preclude[d] this” result, 
id. at 207, and we held that “experience and logic” “is a test 
broadly applicable to issues of access to government 
proceedings, including removal,” id. at 208-09 (emphasis 
added).
16
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 As it relates to our ruling in North Jersey, it bears 
repeating that the existence or non-existence of a Sixth 
Amendment-like provision relating to a particular 
government proceeding is not necessary for the satisfaction of 
the “experience and logic” test.  Thus, in North Jersey, we 
noted that “[t]here is no suggestion [in Richmond 
Newspapers] that the Sixth Amendment is crucial to the right 
of access; indeed, this passage merely states that the Framers 
assumed a common and established practice.”  North Jersey, 
308 F.3d at 208. 
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E.     The Experience and Logic Test is Applicable to 
Polling Places 
 Considering the full sweep of our jurisprudence, we 
now hold that the experience and logic test articulated in 
Richmond Newspapers is applicable to the voting process.  
Indeed, an extension of the “experience and logic” test to the 
polling place is in line with the general trend of our decisional 
authority: that access to government proceedings — in effect, 
access to information about governmental bodies and their 
actions or decisions — must be evaluated with an eye toward 
the historical and structural role of the proceeding.  North 
Jersey and Whiteland are particularly instructive in this 
regard. 
 In North Jersey, we held that the “experience and 
logic” test applies to government proceedings under Articles I 
and II of the Constitution.  Such proceedings include, among 
other things, the process of voting.  While it does not set forth 
the exact nature of the proceeding, Article I of the 
Constitution states that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”  U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  Moreover, Article II declares that 
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State 
may be entitled in the Congress.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 
2.  This latter constitutional mandate grants “plenary power to 
the state legislatures in the matter of the appointment of 
electors,” McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892), 
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thereby ensuring that the voting process is, in no uncertain 
terms, a governmental process and procedure.
17
 
 These mandates to the states are likewise insufficient 
to escape the searching eye of the “experience and logic” test, 
for, in Whiteland, we applied the test to state-level 
proceedings (albeit in dicta).  See also First Amendment 
Coalition, 784 F.2d at 472 (applying the test to a state judicial 
discipline board). 
 Moreover, we believe that this reading of our prior 
decisions fully satisfies — and, in fact, exemplifies — the 
balancing inquiry first articulated by Justice Powell in his 
concurrence in Branzburg.  There is an internal logic to this 
test:  Where both historical and structural considerations 
militate against a presumption of openness, the press and 
public enjoy no constitutionally protected right of access.  In 
such cases, the words of Justice Stewart ring true:  The press 
and public “must rely, as so often in our system we must, on 
the tug and pull of the political forces in American society.”  
Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1173 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or 
of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975)). 
 On the other hand, where history and structure point to 
a presumption of openness, a qualified First Amendment right 
attaches, and the government‟s attempts to cut off access to 
information is subjected to exacting constitutional scrutiny.  
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 What is more:  The process occurring within a 
polling place, as within a courtroom or a legislative meeting, 
is created, circumscribed, directed, and controlled by the 
government.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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See, e.g., Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07; North Jersey, 308 F.3d 
at 217 n.13. 
 Thus, by engaging in the “experience and logic” 
inquiry, we preserve the interests of the government to keep 
private that which always has been and should be private, 
while recognizing the right of the press and the general public 
to enter and access traditionally open nonpublic fora and 
other sources of information about government bodies and 
their actions or decisions.  Where a tradition of openness is 
found, the test ensures that the government cannot cut off 
access without subjecting itself to exacting constitutional 
scrutiny.  By applying the experience and logic test, we 
ensure that the government cannot shroud its activities behind 
a veil of secrecy merely by banning everyone from a 
nonpublic forum.  To hold otherwise would be to invite 
inequitable results, and create the possibility of government 
behavior that frustrates the “„paramount public interest in a 
free flow of information to the people concerning public 
officials.‟”  Pell, 417 U.S. at 832 (quoting Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)). 
F.     Applying the Experience and Logic Test to the 
Instant Case 
 Having determined that the “experience and logic” test 
applies to the voting process, we must now determine 
whether polling places are presumptively open and whether, 
as a result, the Appellant — as well as the general public — is 
presumptively entitled to a right of access pursuant to the 
First Amendment. 
1.     The “Experience” Prong 
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 The framework articulated in Richmond Newspapers 
asks us to consider whether a “„place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public.‟”  
North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 209 (quoting Press-Enterprise, 478 
U.S. at 8).  This analysis begins with a review of historical 
practices associated with a particular place or process; this 
inquiry is objective.  See Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1175.  
Thus, for example, in Capital Cities we held that “the 
relevant historic[al] practice in this case is not specifically 
that of Pennsylvania‟s [D.E.R.]”  Id.  Instead, after 
considering Richmond Newspapers, Globe and Press-
Enterprise, we held that “[i]n each of these cases, the Court 
looked not to the practice of the specific public institution 
involved, but rather to whether the particular type of 
government proceeding had historically been open in our free 
society.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 To meet this objective standard, the Supreme Court 
and the Third Circuit have drawn on a plethora of historical 
sources, including comments made by the Framers, practice 
at the English court of law, congressional procedures, 
relevant regulatory schemes, and court decisions.  See, e.g., 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-73; Publicker, 733 
F.2d at 1068-70; North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 211-15.  This 
wide-ranging inquiry into historical practice is not incidental; 
the “experience” prong sets a relatively high bar, a point we 
recognized in North Jersey, when we compared the tradition 
of open deportation proceedings to the traditions of openness 
discussed in Richmond Newspapers (for criminal trials) and 
Publicker (for civil trials), and held that “deportation hearings 
[do not] boast a tradition of openness sufficient to satisfy 
Richmond Newspapers.”  North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 212-13; 
cf. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 n.9 (failing to find 
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“„a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in 
any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this 
country‟” (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948)); 
Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059 (noting that a common law right 
to access civil trials was “beyond dispute”).   
 In contrast to the criminal and civil trial settings, we 
noted that the “tradition of open deportation hearings is too 
recent and inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of 
access.”  North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 211.  And while we 
acknowledged that “a showing of openness at common law is 
not required” and that “a 1000-year history is unnecessary,” 
we were quick to note our inability to dispense with the 
“experience” analysis “where history is ambiguous or 
lacking, [or] to recognize a First Amendment right based 
solely on the „logic‟ inquiry.”  Id. at 213.18 
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 During our discussion in North Jersey, we 
acknowledged that one of our cases — United States v. 
Simone, 14 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) — applied the 
“experience and logic” test without the benefit of a well-
established tradition of historical openness.  308 F.3d at 213-
14.  The Simone case centered on a claimed right of access to 
post-trial examinations of jury misconduct.  14 F.3d 833.  In 
analyzing the “experience” prong of the Richmond 
Newspapers framework, we noted that “[n]either the parties 
nor this court have been able to find cases dating before 1980 
in support of either openness or closure for this type of post-
trial proceeding.”  Simone, 14 F.3d at 838.  While we 
explicitly stated in Simone that our analysis would “rely 
primarily on the „logic‟ prong of the test,” we acknowledged 
that the experience prong was fulfilled by looking to “other 
phases of the criminal process.”  Id.; see also North Jersey, 
35 
 In the case before us, Appellant seeks access to the 
polling place.
19
  We therefore look to see whether a tradition 
of openness exists for the polling place and the process of 
voting occurring inside.
 20
  Our inquiry includes not just the 
                                                                                                                                  
308 F.3d at 214 (acknowledging the peculiar nature of 
Simone). 
 
19
 We reject the argument, proffered by Appellant‟s 
counsel, that a right of access to polling places exists because 
information about voters is publicly available.  The access 
Appellant seeks is not to this information; it is to the actual 
process occurring within the polling place prior to casting a 
vote.  This crucial distinction also ensures that our decision 
does not pertain to activities such as exit-polling. 
 
20
 Ordinarily, our case law dictates that the complaint 
must allege this tradition of openness.  See Capital Cities, 797 
F.2d at 1175.  In the current matter, we recognize that 
Appellant has not directly engaged with the “experience and 
logic” standard and therefore the complaint is relatively 
devoid of any such allegations.  (As our earlier discussion 
explains, allegations as to the practices surrounding the 
specific government agency, process or law at issue are not 
pertinent.)  However, we believe it is unnecessary to remand 
the case back to the District Court to give Appellant an 
opportunity to amend its pleadings.  As the forthcoming 
analysis will demonstrate, the Supreme Court‟s review of 
elections in America presents a well-rounded picture of how 
restrictions around polling places developed.  We therefore 
think it would be futile for Appellant to try to amend its 
pleadings. 
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act of voting, but also the act of entering the polling place and 
signing in to vote. 
 In light of our reasoning that the “experience” inquiry 
is objective, we begin our analysis with the general voting 
process.  At this level of generality, the Supreme Court‟s 
plurality opinion in Burson is highly instructive.  The facts 
and legal conclusions of the decision are immaterial for our 
present purposes; we are instead interested in the plurality‟s 
thorough exegesis on the history of voting in America.  See 
Burson, 504 U.S. at 200-06.  While a full recapitulation is 
unnecessary, it behooves us to engage in a brief discussion. 
 In the colonial era, voting was conducted by voice vote 
— a process freely accessible to the entire public.  Id. at 200 
(“That voting scheme was not a private affair, but an open, 
public decision, witnessed by all and improperly influenced 
by some.”).  As time went on, and the perils of public voice-
based voting became apparent, the newly-formed states 
adopted systems based on the paper ballot.  Id.  Voters would 
craft their own ballots at home and then bring them to the 
polls.  Id.  However, the trip between the home and the poll 
was not a private or protected affair, and the old evils of 
voice-based voting resurfaced in the form of pre-printed 
ballots, bribery, and intimidation.  Id. at 200-01 (“State 
attempts to standardize the ballots were easily thwarted — the 
vote buyer could simply place a ballot in the hands of the 
bribed voter and watch until he placed it in the polling box.”).  
Under the original ballot-based system, “[a]pproaching the 
polling place . . . was akin to entering an open auction place.  
As the elector started his journey to the polls, he was met by 
various party ticket peddlers „who were only too anxious to 
supply him with their party tickets.‟”  Id. at 202 (quoting 
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Eldon Cobb Evans, A History of the Australian Ballot System 
in the United States 9 (1917)). 
 In the late 1800s, states began adopting “the Australian 
system” of voting.  Id. at 203.  The new system not only 
placed all of the candidates on a single ballot, but it also 
“provided for the erection of polling booths . . . open only to 
election officials, two „scrutinees‟ for each candidate, and 
electors about to vote.”  Id. at 202.  The state laws differed 
mainly in the size of the exclusionary zone that they created 
around the polls.  Id. (“The Massachusetts and New York 
laws differed somewhat from the previous Acts in that they 
excluded the general public only from the area encompassed 
within a guardrail constructed six feet from the voting 
compartments.”).21  “By 1896, almost 90 percent of the States 
had adopted the Australian system.  This accounted for 92 
percent of the national electorate.”  Id. at 204-05.   
 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia added that “[b]y 
1900, at least 34 of the 45 States . . . had enacted such 
restrictions,” and that “most of the statutes banning election-
day speech near the polling place specified the same 
distance”: 100 feet.  Id. at 214-15 & n.1 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (collecting statutes). 
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 The court noted that “[t]his modification was 
considered an improvement because it provided additional 
monitoring by members of the general public and 
independent candidates, who in most States were not allowed 
to be represented by separate inspectors.”  Burson, 504 U.S. 
at 203-04.  
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 Now, returning our focus to Pennsylvania, we note that 
the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates that “[a]ll elections 
by the citizens shall be by ballot or by such other method as 
may be prescribed by law: Provided, That secrecy in voting 
be preserved.”  Pa. Const. art. 7, § 4 (emphasis added).  
Moreover, the provisions in § 3060 limiting access to the 
polling place were adopted 75 years ago.  See Act of June 3, 
1937, P.L. 1333, No. 320, Art. XVIII, § 1220.  While we do 
not look specifically at whether a tradition of openness exists 
in Pennsylvania, we do find it relevant that Pennsylvania laws 
and provisions are in line with the historical development 
discussed by the Supreme Court above. 
 In light of the foregoing discussion — and our earlier 
directive that the tradition of openness must be objectively 
and clearly established — we find that the historical record is 
insufficient to establish a presumption of openness in the 
context of the voting process itself.  While the act of voting 
— and the process by which voting was carried out — began 
its life as a public affair, our Nation‟s history demonstrates a 
decided and long-standing trend away from openness, toward 
a closed electoral process. 
2.     The “Logic” Prong 
 The Richmond Newspapers framework also tasks us 
with considering “whether public access plays a significant 
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question.”  North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 209 (quoting Press-
Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 8).  We have adopted six broad 
“values” that are typically served by openness: 
[1] promotion of informed discussion of 
governmental affairs by providing the public 
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with the more complete understanding of the 
[proceeding]; [2] promotion of the public 
perception of fairness which can be achieved 
only by permitting full public view of the 
proceedings; [3] providing a significant 
community therapeutic value as an outlet for 
community concern, hostility and emotion; [4] 
serving as a check on corrupt practices by 
exposing the [proceeding] to public scrutiny; [5] 
enhancement of the performance of all 
involved; and [6] discouragement of [fraud]. 
United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1994).  Of 
course, these are general categories and the list is by no 
means exhaustive or mandatory.  For the logic prong to be 
satisfied, it need not be shown that the government process or 
the general public will benefit in all six ways from press and 
public access. 
 In addition to considering the benefits that would 
result from press and public access, we must “take account of 
the flip side — the extent to which openness impairs the 
public good.”  North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 217.  Indeed, the 
logic analysis must account for the negative effects of 
openness, for otherwise “it is difficult to conceive of a 
government proceeding to which the public would not have a 
First Amendment right of access.”  Id. (“[P]ublic access to 
any government affair, even internal CIA deliberations, 
would „promote informed discussion‟ among the citizenry.  It 
is unlikely the Supreme Court intended this result.”).  And 
while the consideration of potentially detrimental effects is 
speculative, we have held that “the Richmond Newspapers 
logic prong is unavoidably speculative.”  Id. at 219. 
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 Finally, we note that a necessary corollary to the 
“experience” prong being an objective inquiry is that the 
“logic” prong is likewise an objective inquiry.  To hold 
otherwise would lead to untenable consequences:  First 
Amendment rights of access would not only vary from venue 
to venue, but they would be subject to a kind of arbitrary 
examination that is anathema to our system of defined 
constitutional rights. 
 In the case before us, we begin by noting the rather 
obvious fact that openness of the voting process helps prevent 
election fraud, voter intimidation, and various other kinds of 
electoral evils.  “[S]unlight,” as has so often been observed, 
“is the most powerful of all disinfectants.”  N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964).  Of course, in situations 
where the press is not geographically far removed from the 
proceedings anyway, the benefits of additional oversight are 
inversely proportional to the distance of the press.  The 
situation in Pennsylvania is a fine example:  The press (like 
the general public) is only 10 feet away from the polling 
place, and we have no tangible or discernible evidence of how 
the public good would benefit so much more from the press 
being inside the room, rather than several paces away.
22
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 At oral argument it became apparent that the press 
could simply stand at the 10-foot mark, point their cameras 
inside the polling place — which we note again is just the 
room designated for voting — and begin to record the 
activity.  Counsel for Appellee conceded that this would be 
permissible, and counsel for Appellant had no satisfactory 
response as to how or why this procedure would not serve the 
Appellant‟s interest. 
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 Appellant argues that access to the polling place was 
particularly necessary during this past election because of the 
Voter ID Law.  More specifically, Appellant argues that the 
Voter ID Law — part of which was suspended for purposes 
of the November 6, 2012 election — may have caused voter 
confusion as to whether identification is required in order to 
cast a vote.  As a result, Appellant argues that it was of the 
utmost importance for reporters to observe and record the 
goings on at the sign-in table during this election.  We agree 
that openness in a situation where new legislation is being 
implemented or tested would generally serve the public good.  
It implicates several of the broad categories recognized in 
Simone, including the “promotion of informed discussion of 
governmental affairs by providing the public with [a] more 
complete understanding of the [proceeding].”  Simone, 14 
F.3d at 839.  We therefore consider this as a factor weighing 
in favor of satisfying the “logic” prong.23 
 The experience and logic test requires that we also 
examine the potential dangers inherent in openness.  Of 
greatest concern to us is that access for one is access for all.  
While Appellant urges that its reporters should be permitted 
to access the polling place for purposes of gathering news, 
there is no constitutionally valid way of limiting the right of 
access only to Appellant.  Finding a right of access for one 
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 The weight we accord to this fact in our inquiry 
under the logic prong would be different if the Voter ID Law 
actually had been implemented; indeed, our entire analysis of 
the “experience and logic” test could be different.  However, 
that case is not before us, and we decline to speculate 
regarding its effect.  As both parties concede, November 6, 
2012 represented only a “soft test” of its implementation.   
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member of the press necessarily means that all other members 
of the press must or should share in that right. 
 This brings us to the next concern, raised at oral 
argument:  Who is a member of the press?  Even if we were 
inclined to find a special First Amendment right for the press 
in this case (which we explicitly refuse to do), the class of 
persons to whom such a right is applicable is almost 
boundless.  Counsel for Appellant could not divine a way to 
confine the potential beneficiaries of a ruling in its favor.
24
   
 Moreover, there is a very real possibility that the 
presence of reporters during the sign-in period, when 
individuals are necessarily exchanging personal information 
in preparation for casting a private vote, could concern, 
intimidate or even turn away potential voters. 
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 More recently, membership in the Fourth Estate has 
been democratized.  Access to blogs, smartphones, and an 
extensive network of social media sites (not the least of which 
are Twitter and Facebook) have transformed all of us into 
potential members of the media.  While in almost any other 
situation this would be a boon to a free and democratic 
society, in the context of the voting process, the confusion 
and chaos that would result from a potentially limitless 
number of reporters in a polling place would work the 
opposite effect, potentially creating confusion, frustration, 
and delay.  This is to say nothing of our earlier holding that 
the rights of access for the press and public are co-extensive.  
In this situation, anyone could record in the polling place if 
the First Amendment protected the right of access thereto. 
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 On balance then, we find the “logic” prong of this 
inquiry disfavors finding a constitutionally protected right of 
access to the voting process.  We therefore find that both 
prongs of the “experience and logic” test militate against 
finding a right of access in this case.  As in North Jersey, we 
note that while the Constitution does not provide protection 
under the First Amendment, “there is, as always, the powerful 
check of political accountability.”  North Jersey, 308 F.3d at 
220. 
G.     Beacon Journal is Unpersuasive 
 Despite clear indications by the Supreme Court and 
this Circuit that the experience and logic test is the 
appropriate analytical framework for the instant dispute, 
Appellant urges us to follow the Sixth Circuit‟s conclusion in 
Beacon Journal Publishing Co., Inc. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 
683 (6th Cir. 2004), a decision whose reasoning is ambiguous 
at best.  We decline to do so. 
 The Beacon Journal court analyzed the 
constitutionality of an Ohio statute similar to Pennsylvania‟s 
§ 3060(d) as applied to members of the media.  Like § 
3060(d), the Ohio law mandated that “[n]o person, not an 
election official, employee, witness, challenger, or police 
officer, shall be allowed to enter the polling place during the 
election, except for the purpose of voting.”  Id. at 684 
(quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3501.35 (2002)).  The 
Beacon Journal Publishing Company (which published the 
Beacon Journal newspaper) moved for injunctive relief, 
arguing that the law “abridg[ed its] First Amendment rights.”  
Id.  The Sixth Circuit, without fully setting out the basis for 
its decision, applied strict scrutiny and held that the 
government had made no showing that the law was 
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“necessary to further the state‟s [interest in ensuring orderly 
elections] and „narrowly drawn to achieve that end.‟”  Id. at 
685 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).  It therefore concluded 
that the Ohio law likely abridged the freedom of the press, 
and ordered that the injunction be granted and that the state 
“immediately and forthwith permit [Beacon Journal] to have 
reasonable access to any polling place for the purpose of 
news-gathering and reporting so long as [Beacon Journal 
does] not interfere with poll workers and voters as voters 
exercise their right to vote.”  Id. 
 Beacon Journal‟s citation to Perry for the strict 
scrutiny standard is telling (and troubling).  The Perry case, 
which concerned a law regulating expressive activity in a 
public school, formulated its analysis this way:  “The 
existence of a right of access to public property and the 
standard by which limitations upon such a right must be 
evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at 
issue.”  Perry, 460 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added).  As we have 
explained above, the “right of access” at issue in Perry 
concerned access to a forum for speech purposes.  The right 
at issue in this case (and in Beacon Journal) is different — it 
concerns the right of access to a government proceeding for 
news-gathering purposes. 
 Moreover, in applying a forum analysis, the Sixth 
Circuit apparently took the polling place to be a public forum.  
This is incorrect and stands adverse to both Supreme Court 
precedent and our precedent.  As we have just held: a polling 
place is a nonpublic forum, requiring the government to 
satisfy only a reasonableness analysis.  Therein lies our 
discord with the Beacon Journal ruling.  As our foregoing 
discussion demonstrates, adopting a traditional forum analysis 
for cases such as the one at bar sets a dangerous precedent 
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which permits the government too much freedom to hide their 
activities from the public‟s view.  We cannot accept this 
result.  Beacon Journal is a precedent we cannot follow.
25
 
 As there is no protected First Amendment right of 
access to a polling place for news-gathering purposes, we find 
that Appellant has failed to state a claim and affirm the 
District Court‟s dismissal of Count I. 
IV.     Equal Protection 
 Appellant also alleges that the Commonwealth‟s 
application of § 3060(d), forbidding it from entering polling 
places in Allegheny and Beaver Counties, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Appellant asserts that the Boards of 
Elections in Pennsylvania counties other than Allegheny and 
Beaver counties permit reporters to enter the polling place 
and take photographs or otherwise record the proceedings.  
Appellant supports its claim by pointing to a host of 
photographs taken by other Pennsylvania newspapers inside 
polling places.  Additionally, Appellant claims that officials 
in Allegheny County have on previous occasions permitted 
the media (presumably including Appellant‟s own reporters) 
                                                          
 
25
 We note also that in rejecting Beacon Journal we are 
not disagreeing with any of our other sister circuits.  The 
Beacon Journal decision seems to stand alone, even within 
the Sixth Circuit.  Indeed, in the eight years since the decision 
(a span of time which covered four national elections), only 
one court in the entire country has cited Beacon Journal for 
its holding regarding the right of access: the District Court 
opinion in this case.  PG Publ’g Co., 2012 WL 4796017, at 
*25. 
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entry into the polling place to photograph “certain public 
figures” during the voting process.  On the basis of these 
allegations, Appellant urges that it was and is being 
discriminated against in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 Appellee does not dispute that § 3060(d) is selectively 
enforced across the Commonwealth.  Indeed, Appellee 
conceded as much during oral argument.  Instead, Appellee 
argues that the alleged selective enforcement of § 3060(d) 
cannot sustain an equal protection claim and that any 
disparate enforcement comes from the structure of the 
Commonwealth‟s electoral process.  That is, Appellee asserts 
that each Board of Elections operates in complete autonomy, 
and therefore, the decisions of one cannot be compared to the 
decisions of the others.
26
 
 For the reasons discussed below, we agree with 
Appellee that the selective enforcement of § 3060(d) does not 
give rise to a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Consequently, we hold that the District Court rightfully 
dismissed Appellant‟s claim. 
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 By contrast, Appellant alleges that the “the 
Commonwealth, through its political subdivisions,” violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.  As a necessary consequence, 
Appellant argues that every instance of enforcement or non-
enforcement of § 3060(d) can be attributed directly to the 
Commonwealth as a whole and, by extension, the Secretary 
for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Appellee).  We need 
not reach this argument for Appellant‟s claim is properly 
disposed of on other grounds. 
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A.     The “Class of One” Argument 
 The Fourteenth Amendment dictates that a state may 
not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  The 
purpose of this clause is “to secure every person within the 
State‟s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a 
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted 
agents.”  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 
(2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 
U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).  Where a litigant asserts a so-called 
“class of one” Equal Protection challenge, alleging that the 
litigant itself, and not a particular group, was the subject of 
discriminatory treatment under a particular law, we have 
required the litigant to allege “that she has been intentionally 
treated differently from others similarly situated and that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”  
Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 860 (3d Cir. 
2012) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564). 
 The allegations presented in Appellant‟s Complaint do 
not demonstrate that Appellant was “intentionally treated 
differently” from other newspapers in Pennsylvania.  In fact, 
the Complaint fails to present a single example where another 
newspaper sought and obtained access to a polling place in a 
location where Appellant could not.  As the District Court 
recognized, “[t]he facts alleged by [Appellant] suggest only 
that employees of the Post-Gazette unsuccessfully sought to 
enter polling places located in counties where § 3060(d) is 
enforced, and that employees of other newspapers were 
allowed to enter polling places in counties where § 3060(d) is 
not enforced.”  PG Publ’g Co., 2012 WL 4796017, at *29.  
Still, we must delve deeper, for Appellant urges us that it has 
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alleged a scheme of selective enforcement sufficient to 
implicate the Equal Protection Clause. 
B.     The “Selective Enforcement” Argument 
 The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the “selective 
enforcement” of a law based on an unjustifiable standard.  
Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 297 (3d Cir. 
2006); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 
125 n.9 (1979).  Thus, to establish a selective-enforcement 
claim, Appellant must demonstrate: “(1) that [it] was treated 
differently from other similarly situated [entities], and (2) 
„that this selective treatment was based on an unjustifiable 
standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary 
factor, . . . or to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.‟”  
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d 
Cir. 2005)).  To maintain its equal protection claim, Appellant 
must show not only that the administration of § 3060(d) has 
resulted in “unequal application to those who are entitled to 
be treated alike,” but also that there is “an element of 
intentional or purposeful discrimination” present.  Snowden v. 
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); see also Jewish Home of E. Pa. 
v. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., 693 F.3d 359, 363 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]o maintain an equal protection claim of 
this sort, [plaintiff] must provide evidence of discriminatory 
purpose, not mere unequal treatment or adverse effect.”). 
 Here, we find that Appellant has failed to set forth the 
necessary allegations.  Even if we accept all of Appellant‟s 
allegations at face value, as we must, we see no sign of “clear 
and intentional discrimination.”  Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Complaint 
demonstrates only that in some instances, reporters from 
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newspapers in some counties were permitted into the polling 
place, while reporters in other counties were not.  This is 
insufficient to allege a systemic discriminatory purpose.  
Accord Jewish Home, 693 F.3d at 363 (finding no “[s]elective 
discriminatory enforcement” where facts demonstrated only 
that some facilities were penalized less often than plaintiff).  
The law cannot provide a constitutional remedy for every 
situation where a party may feel slighted; claims appealing to 
the Equal Protection Clause must meet a higher bar. 
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C.     The “Inconsistent Application” Argument 
 Finally, we address Appellant‟s allegation that, in the 
past, reporters were permitted to enter polling places and 
photograph elected officials casting their votes.  It is well-
established that “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in 
enforcement [of a law] is not in itself a federal constitutional 
violation.”  Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34, 35 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“A prosecutor is not bound to use the habitual criminal 
statute in every case to which it could be applied.”). 
 Here, the issue lies not in the inconsistent application 
of the statute to Appellants, but in the absence of any 
allegations suggesting some invidious intent.  Appellant has 
not set forth sufficient factual allegations to allow this Court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the disparate treatment 
of Appellant‟s own reporters was occasioned by some 
specific agenda aimed at discriminating against Appellant‟s 
personnel in particular.
27
  To hold, without more, that the on-
again/off-again enforcement of § 3060(d) amounts to an 
Equal Protection Clause violation would unduly — and 
imprudently — expand the reach of the Clause.  We decline 
to do so, and instead affirm the District Court. 
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 For example, Appellant presents no allegations that 
its reporters were barred from the polling place for printing 
news items or editorials that were critical of the government.  
See Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1176. 
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V.     The Consent Decree 
 We now come to the Consent Order.  Appellant argues 
that the District Court erred in refusing to enter the Order.  
Appellant argues that the parties in a litigation may agree to 
any relief that is “within the general scope of the case made 
by the pleadings.”  Pac. R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 
(1879).  Given that this court is not “necessarily barred from 
entering a consent decree . . . [that] provides broader relief 
than the court could have awarded after a trial,” Local No. 93, 
Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland, 478 
U.S. 501, 525 (1986), Appellant urges that the parties to the 
Consent Order should “obtain the injunctive benefits of the 
settlement agreement they negotiated,” Carson v. Am. 
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 89 (1981).  In light of our 
discussion regarding the constitutionality of § 3060(d), we 
hold that the court below did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to enter the consent decree. 
 Consent decrees — such as the Consent Order — have 
“elements of both contracts and judicial decrees.”  Frew v. 
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004).  Thus, a consent decree 
represents “„an agreement that the parties desire and expect 
will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree 
that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other 
judgments and decrees.‟”  Id. (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of 
Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992)).  Consequently, 
the parties cannot circumvent valid state laws by way of a 
consent decree.  See, e.g., Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 
47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995) (“While parties can settle 
their litigation with consent decrees, they cannot agree to 
„disregard valid state laws . . . .”); St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. 
Kurtz, 643 F.3d 264, 270 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a state 
court can approve a consent order “overrid[ing] state law” 
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only where there exists a “federal constitutional or statutory 
violation”).28 
 As our foregoing analysis of Appellant‟s First 
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims 
demonstrates, § 3060(d) does not give rise to a violation of 
federal statutory or constitutional law and is therefore a valid 
state statute.  Thus, the District Court did not err in refusing 
to enter a consent decree that would violate a valid state 
law.
29
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 See also Soc’y Hill Civic Ass’n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 
1045, 1060 (3d Cir. 1980) (“A consent decree need not in 
explicit terms require that the actions specified therein shall 
be carried out in conformity with all applicable federal, state 
and local law.  It is sufficient if it does not authorize or 
require conduct in violation of the law.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.3 (1989). 
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 Appellant argues that the District Court improperly 
held that the Board of Elections‟ authority did not allow it to 
enter into a consent decree that contravened valid state law.  
Instead, Appellant avers that the Board‟s “broad discretion” 
permits it to “issue rules and regulations for the guidance of 
election officers,” which in turn permits it to enter into this 
particular consent decree.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 33-34.)  
Assuming, arguendo, Appellant‟s position, we still find that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  Regardless of 
what the Allegheny County Board of Elections‟ authority 
may entail, Appellant does not — and likely cannot — 
maintain that it extends to overriding an existing state law.  
Even if the Board may choose not to apply the law, § 3060(d) 
would still remain a valid state statute, and the District Court 
53 
VI.     Conclusion 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s decision to grant Appellee‟s motion to 
dismiss and hold it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
enter the Consent Order. 
                                                                                                                                  
cannot lend its imprimatur to an order that would sanction its 
contravention.  See, e.g., Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216 (holding that 
parties to a consent decree “cannot consent to do something 
together that they lack the power to do individually”); Keith v. 
Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
parties to a consent decree cannot “agree to terms which 
would exceed their authority and supplant state law”). 
